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Abstract
We studied the protectionist character of a miminum quality standard (MQS). We show
that in the ﬁxed cost model where two ﬁrms, one local and one foreign, compete in a local
market, the implementation of a MQS on the local market is a protectionist political only if the
local ﬁrm supplies the lower quality, whatever the type of competition (Cournot or Bertrand)
and the technology diﬀerential between the ﬁrms.
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11 Introduction
The success of GATT in reducing the trade barriers such as tariﬀs, quotas and voluntary ex-
portations restrictions has been accompanied by an increase in the using of others trade restrictions
specially the standards. The Marrakech agreements established that local standards can diﬀer from
international standards only when the objective is legitimate and when there is a scientiﬁc evidence
to the use of these instruments.
S ot h es t a n d a r dm a yb ec o n s i d e r e dl i k el e g i t i m a t e . I t so b j e c t i v em a yb et h ep r o t e c t i o no f
human health or safety, or the live or health of plant or the environment. But this instrument may
be used in a protectionist aim, they may alter the market outcome in favor of local industry. In
this case, it is very diﬃcult to see if the goal of the standard is legitimate or protectionist.
A series of articles have studied the protectionist character of standards. So Barrett (1994)
shows that when two ﬁrms, one domestic and the other foreign, compete in quantities in a third
market, then the domestic government has an incentive a weak restrictive standard for his ﬁrm.
This standard increases the competitiveness of the local ﬁrm. The environmental objective is
inferior to commercial objective. Fisher and Serra (2000) analyse the implementation of a standard
when a local ﬁrm and a foreign ﬁrm compete in quantities in a domestic market. They show that the
local social planner always implements a protectionist standard. Indeed the level of the standard
chosen by the local social planner is always superior to the level chosen by the social planner
when both ﬁrms are domestic. Moreover, Mattoo (2001) shows that even when a standard is not
discriminatory (i.e. its implementation entails an identical incremental cost to all producers), it
can alter the market outcome in favor of the domestic producers. The feature of these models is to
concern minimum standards and not minimum quality standards (MQS). Conversely to MQS, the
minimum standards have not direct eﬀect on the utility of consumer, indeed the quality of products
is the same after and before the standard. In these models the products are not diﬀerentiated, and
the standards do not increase the quality of the products but the marginal cost of production of
these products.
2If the protectionist character of minimum standards is studied by the literature, in my knowl-
edge only Das and Donnenfeld (1989) are studied the protectionist character of MQS. These authors
propose a duopolistic model comprising a local and a foreign ﬁrm. These ﬁrms compete in quali-
ties and in quantities. The authors show that the MQS alter the market outcome in favor of local
industry only in the case where the local ﬁrm supplies the lower quality, this instrument is then
protectionist.
This paper expands the approach of Das and Donnenfeld to a “ﬁxed cost of quality model”.
The literature which analyses the eﬀects of the MQS on the market proposes two ways. A part
of authors assumes that the MQS increases only the marginal production costs, the models are
then referred to as a “variable cost of quality model”. It is the case for Das and Donnenfeld
(1989), Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) and Crampes and Hollander (1995). The other part of
authors assumes that the MQS increases only the ﬁx e dc o s t s ,t h em o d e l sa r et h e nr e f e r r e dt oa sa
“ﬁxed cost of quality model”. It is the case for Ronnen (1991), Boom (1995.)o rC o n s t a n t a t o sa n d
Perrakis (1998).
In order to analyze the protectionist character of SQM, we must deﬁne when the MQS is an
instrument protectionist. Baldwin (1970) deﬁnes a protectionist measure such as the real global
income decrease after its implementation. Das and Donnenfeld (1989) characterize a MQS as
protectionist if its implementation improves the situation of the local ﬁrm to the detriment of the
foreign ﬁrm. Fisher and Serra (2001) propose the following deﬁnition: “A minimum standard is
said to be non-protectionist when it corresponds to the standard the local social planner would use
if both ﬁrms were domestic”. In this paper, we decide to use the Das and Donnenfeld’s criteria, so
we assume that the MQS is protectionist if it increases the market shares and the proﬁto ft h el o c a l
ﬁrm to the detriment to the market shares and the proﬁt of foreign ﬁrm. We have two criteria, one
on the quantities and one on the proﬁt. We study exclusively when both ﬁrms stay in the market
after the implementation of the MQS. Indeed, it is easy to conclude that the SQM is protectionist
when the foreign ﬁrm goes out the market , but it is not easy when both ﬁrms stay in the market.
3The contribution of this paper is to show that in the ﬁxed cost model where two ﬁrms, one local
and one foreign, compete in a local market, the MQS is protectionist only if the local ﬁrm supplies
the lower quality whatever the type of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and the technology
diﬀerential between the ﬁrms.
The next section describes the model. In the section 3 and 4 we present successively the
Cournot competition and the Bertrand competition. In the last section we discuss the results and
we conclude.
2 The basic model
There are two ﬁrms, one located in an home country and other, in foreign country. Each ﬁrms
produces a quality diﬀerentiated product, all of which is sold to home country market. The ﬁrm h
produces a good h with high quality qh and the ﬁrm l produces a good l with low quality ql.T h e r e
a r et w op o s s i b l ec a s e s:t h eﬁrm h is the local ﬁrm and the ﬁrm l is the foreign ﬁrm and conversely.
The games between ﬁrms involves a sub-game perfect equilibrium with two stages of decision. In
stage 1: the ﬁrms chose the quality level at a Nash equilibrium. In stage 2: the producers decide
simultaneously whether how many customers to supply if quantity is the decision variable (Cournot
competition) or the prices (Bertrand competition). As Das and Donnenfeld (1989) and Zhou and al.
(2001) we assume that the costs of ﬁrms are asymmetric. This assumption generalizes the results
to the trade north south (high technology diﬀerential) and the trade north north (low technology
diﬀerential). So, the ﬁrm h requires an investment γhF(qh) to produce a product h and the ﬁrm l
requires an investment γlF(ql)t op r o d u c eap r o d u c tl,w i t hγl > γh > 0. γl − γh represents the
technology diﬀerential between the foreign ﬁrm and the home ﬁrm. F(q)a n dF0(q) are assumed
increasing functions of q for all feasible qualities q ∈ [0,∞). We assume that F(0) = F0(0) = 0,
limq→∞ F0(q)=∞ and F000(q) = 0 i.e. F00(qh)=F00(ql). And we assume that there are no variable
production costs. This model is a “ﬁxed cost of quality model”.
The basic features of consumer demand used are standard in studies of quality diﬀerentiation,
4as Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Ronnen (1991). There is a continuum of consumers, uniformly
distributed on [0,1] according to their taste parameter θ. Consumers purchase at most one unit of
either ﬁrm h’s product or ﬁrme l’s product. Otheir things being equal, consumers prefer a higher
quality product. Consumer θ maximizes the following indirect utility function:
uθ,i = θqi − pi if the consumer purchases the quality qi at price pi,0i ft h ec o n s u m e rd o e sn o t
purchases, ∀i ∈ l,h
To determine the demand faced by the high quality and low quality ﬁrm, divide the interval
[0,1] into three segments. Let θ1 =
ph−pl
qh−ql and θ0 =
pl
ql (see ﬁgure 1). Consumers with θ = θ0 will
be indiﬀerent between purchasing the low quality product and no purchasing at all. Consumers
with θ = θ1 will be indiﬀerent between purchasing the high quality product or the low quality
product.
 0  θ0   θ1   1 
Consumers do not 
purchase 
Consumers purchase 
the low quality 
product 
Consumers purchase 
the high quality 
product 
Figure 1: Market shares of ﬁrms
The demands are then given by:
xh =1− θ1 =1−
ph−pl





3 Duopoly equilibrium under Cournot competition
From the demand functions we obtain the inverse demand functions:
pl =( 1− xh)ql − xlql et ph =( 1− xh)qh − xlql.
5We examine the second-stage ﬁrst. The ﬁrms compete in quantities and maximize their respec-
tive proﬁt1 πi = xipi − γiF(qi)w i t hi = h,l. We obtain the best reponse functions: xh =
qh−xlql
2qh
and xl = 1




4qh−ql and pl =
qhql
4qh−ql, the equilibrium quantities xh =
2qh−ql
4qh−ql and xl =
qh
4qh−ql,a s
the marginal consumers: θ0 =
qh
4qh−ql and θ1 =
2qh
4qh−ql.
Notice that the quality-adjusted price Pi =
pi
qi with (i ∈ h,l) equals the equilibrium quantities
xi.S o: Ph = xh = 2r−1
4r−1 and Pl = xl = r
4r−1 with r =
qh
ql ≥ 1, dPh
dr = dxh
dr > 0a n ddPl
dr = dxl
dr < 0.
We determine the properties of Rh and Rl with Rh = xhph and Rl = xlpl (Appendix 1).
In the ﬁrst-stage the ﬁrms chose the quality level. The ﬁrm h chose qh,t h eﬁrm l chose ql,
with qh ≥ ql.C o n s i d e rﬁrst the high quality producer’s best reponse to ql.F o rag i v e nql the high
quality seller maximizes its proﬁt subject to ql ≤ qh. This problem has a unique solution satisfysing




2). Using the ﬁrst order condition, we determine the high quality producer’s best reponse noted
bh(ql) . T h es a m ew a y ,w ed e t e r m i n et h el o wq u a l i t yp r o d u c e r ’ sb e s tr e p o n s et oqh noted bl(qh).
For a given qh the low quality seller maximizes its proﬁt subject to ql ≤ qh. This problem has a
























By fully diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ql, and by using the Euler’s









































∂xh∂xl =4 qhql − q2
l > 0
6The best reponse function bh(ql) is restricted, because if ql is relatively high, the best reponse of
the ﬁrm h is to enter the market as the quality qh seller with qh ≤ ql. Just as for the best reponse
function bl(qh), so if qh is relatively low, the best reponse of the ﬁrm l is to enter the market as
the quality ql seller with ql ≥ qh.
When the technology diﬀerential is important, the best reponse functions are not restricted.
There is only one equilibrium. The equilibrium where the ﬁrm h supplies the low quality and the









Figure 2: Best reponse functions under Cournot competition.
The best reponse function bh(ql) is increasing with the level of ql, conversely of best reponse
function bl(qh) which is decreasing with the level of qh (see ﬁgure 2). As r =
qh
ql > 1, the best
reponse functions are on top of the 45◦ straight line.




l ), they are stable. And the proﬁta r e
positive for qh >q l (Annexe 5).
Consequences of a minimum quality standard.
The local social planner introduces a MQS qsqm such as qsqm >q ∗
l .W ea s s u m et h a tqsqm −q∗
l
is weak to assure that two ﬁrms stay in the market. Indeed, since the proﬁts are positive before
the introduction of the SQM and since Rh(bh(ql),q l) − γhF(bh(ql)) and Rl(bh(ql),q l) − γlF(ql)
7are continous in ql, there exists ql noted qc and superior to q∗
l such that if qsqm ∈ (q∗
l ,qc]t h e
proﬁts are positive when (bh(qsqm),qsqm) is played. Hence (bh(qsqm),qsqm) is an equilibrium when
qsqm ∈ (q∗
l ,qc]. The ﬁrm l sells a product of standard quality qsqm and the ﬁrm h a product of
quality qh = bh(qsqm)w i t hqh >q ∗
h and qh >q sqm.
Proposition 1 The introduction of a MQS, close to q∗
l , improves the level of high quality and




















This result is in accordance with the result of Ronnen (1991). The introduction of the MQS





,s ot h i sﬁrm
improves its quality: qh increases. But increasing the quality is more costly to the high quality seller
than to the low quality seller. The proportional increase in qh is less than the proportional increase
in ql, r decreases. This result can appear in contradiction to the assumption that γl > γh > 0,
but lower is γh higher is q∗
h (Appendix 6), so it is impossible to the ﬁrm h to improve its quality
in the same proportion that the rise of the low quality. The proportional increase in qh is equal to
the proportional increase in ql only if r = q0
h i.e. γh =0 .
Proposition 2 The introduction of a MQS, close to q∗
l , decreases the high quality product demand,
increases the low quality product demand and consumers which are no active (see ﬁgure 3).
If the local ﬁrm produces the high quality, the MQS decreases its market shares and increases
the market shares of the foreign ﬁr m;i ft h el o c a lﬁrm produces the low quality, the MQS increases







(4qh−ql)2 < 0 because r>q
0















(4qh−ql)2 > 0 because r>q
0





(4qh−ql)2 > 0 because r>q
0
h
For understand this result, note that the introduction of a SQM decreases r (Proposition 1),
and for xh and xl ﬁxed, a decreases of r shifts down the demand curve for product h, decreasing
8the willingness of consumers to pay for the high quality product, but the willingness of consumers
to pay for the low quality product is the same2. The high quality product demand is lower so
the ﬁrm h decreases its supply. The ﬁrm l reacts and increases its production. Notice that the
quality-adjusted price of the high quality product decreases while the quality-adjusted price of the
low quality product increases. The marginal consumer of the ﬁrm l becomes no active, while the
marginal consumer of the ﬁrm h alters his behaviour and purchases the low quality product.




























Figure 3: SQM impacts on the market shares of ﬁrms
Conversely to Das and Donnenfeld (1989), the number of consumers who switch from the ﬁrm
h to the ﬁrm l is suﬃcient to oﬀset the number of customers that exit the market.
The surplus of consumers increases:
SC =
R θ1




















We may note that the surplus increases for all consumers (Appendix 7)
While the proﬁts of both ﬁrms decreases. Using the envelope theorem, we observe that:
dπh(qh,ql)
dql = ∂Rh






The rise of low quality decreases the revenue of the ﬁrm h,t h i sﬁrm improves its quality, but
it is insuﬃcient, its proﬁt decreases. The rise of high quality decreases the revenue of the ﬁrm l.
2vh the willingness of consumers to pay for the high quality product and vl the willingness of consumers to pay
for the low quality product, as vh =
ph
qh =( 1− xh) −
xl
r and vl =
pl





r2 > 0a n d
∂vl
∂r =0
9Both ﬁrms are worse oﬀ compared to the equilibrium of the unregulated market. But the ﬁrm h
cannot drive the ﬁrm l to play the quality ql of the initial Cournot Nash game, because this one
cannot supply a quality inferior to the standard quality.
Now, we examine the eﬀe c t so ft h eM Q So nt h es o c i a lw e l f a r e 3.
The MQS has ambigous eﬀects on the social welfare, these eﬀects depend to origins of the ﬁrms.
Proposition 3 When the home ﬁrm produces the high quality good, the introduction of the MQS,
close to q∗
l , decreases the social welfare wh.




θ0 (θql −pl)dθ. By fully diﬀerentiating
wh with respect to ql, substituting γhF0(qh)b yMRh and γhF00 by MRh












l) < 0w i t hσ =
ql
qh and σ ∈ ]0,1[ (Appendix
8)
The rise of the surplus of consumers is insuﬃcient to compensate the reduction of the proﬁto f
the local ﬁrm. Das and Donnenfeld (1989) obtain the same results in a “variable cost of quality
model”. This result is ambigous, indeed the MQS improves the qualities but decreases the local
social welfare.
Proposition 4 When the home ﬁrm produces the low quality good, the introduction of the MQS,
close to q∗
l , increases the social welfare wl.
Proof. wl = πl + scl + sch =
R θ1
θ0 (θql)dθ − γlF(ql)+
R 1
θ1(θqh − ph)dθ. By fully diﬀerentiating



















To understand these both results, note that the MQS has a negative eﬀect more important on
the ﬁrm h than the ﬁrm l. Indeed, as a result of the MQS, both ﬁrms increase theirs costs, but
3The social welfare is the sum between the surplus of consumers and the proﬁto ft h el o c a lﬁrm.
10only the ﬁrm h must decrease its output, this beneﬁts to the ﬁrm l (Proposition 2). So, the rise
o fs u r p l u si ss u ﬃcient to compensate the reduction of the proﬁto ft h el o c a lﬁrm, if only this one
supplies the lower quality.
Finally, we show that the protectionist character also depends to origins of the ﬁrms.
Proposition 5 When the home ﬁrm produces the high-quality product, the introduction of the
MQS, close to q∗
l , may not be considered like a protectionist instrument, the quantity of the foreign
products does not decrease, and there is not monetary transfer of the foreign ﬁrm proﬁtt ot h e
home ﬁrm proﬁt. Whereas when the home ﬁrm produces the low-quality product, the introduction
of the MQS, close to q∗
l , decreases the quantity of the foreign products in favor of the home ﬁrm,
the MQS is a protectionist instrument, the criterion on the quantity is broken.
We note that if the objective of the government is to improve the qualities and increase the
home social welfare, a MQS (equal to qc) is implement only if the local ﬁrm supplies the lower
quality. Then this instrument may be consider like protectionist because one of both criteria is
broken.
These results and the results of Das and Donnenfeld (1989) are similar. The MQS may be
consider like a protectionist instrument only when the home ﬁrm produces the low quality level.
We note that in the model of Das et Donnenfeld, only the criteria on the proﬁti sb r o k e n .I no u r
model only the criterion on the quantity is broken.
4 Duopoly equilibrium under Bertrand competition
We examine the second-stage ﬁrst. The ﬁrms compete in prices and maximize their respective
proﬁt4. We obtain the best reponse functions: ph = 1
2qh− 1
2ql+ 1
2pl and pl = 1
2
ph
qhql.F r o mt h eb e s t


























11reponse functions and the demand functions, we determine the prices, the equilibrium quantities
and the marginal consumers:
ph =
2(qh−ql)qh










4qh−ql and θ1 =
2qh−ql
4qh−ql
































dr = − 2




dr = − 1
(4r−1)2 < 0
In a Cournot competition, an increase of r increases the consummation and the quality-adjusted
price of the high quality product but decreases the consummation and the quality-adjusted price
of the low quality product.
We determine the properties of Rh and Rl with Rh = xhph and Rl = xlpl (Appendix 1).
Like in the environment of Cournot competition, the ﬁrms chose the quality level. The ﬁrm h
chose qh,t h eﬁrm l chose ql,w i t hqh ≥ ql.C o n s i d e rﬁrst the high quality producer’s best reponse
to ql.F o rag i v e nql the high quality seller maximizes its proﬁt subject to ql ≤ qh. This problem





< 0 (Appendix 2). Using the ﬁrst order condition, we determine the high quality
producer’s best reponse noted bh(ql). The same way, we determine the low quality producer’s best
reponse to qh noted bl(qh). For a given qh the low quality seller maximizes its proﬁt subject to
ql ≤ qh. This problem has a unique solution satisfysing MRl(qh,q l)=γlF0(ql)w i t hql ∈ [0,q h], as
the second order condition : ∂2πl
∂q2
l



















∂qh > 0 (Appendix 3).
12By fully diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ql, and by using the Euler’s





















> 0( 2 )
The best reponse function bh(ql) is restricted, because if ql is relatively high, the best reponse of
the ﬁrm h is to enter the market as the quality qh seller with qh ≤ ql. Just as for the best reponse
function bl(qh), so if qh is relatively low, the best reponse of the ﬁrm l is to enter the market as









Figure 4: Best reponse functions under Bertrand competition.
The best reponse function bh(ql) is increasing with the level of ql, like the best reponse function
bl(qh) which is increasing with the level of qh (see ﬁgure 4). As r =
qh
ql > 1, the best reponse
functions are on top of the 45◦ straight line.




l ), it are stable. And the proﬁta r e
positive for qh >q l (Appendix 5).
13Consequences of a minimum quality standard.
Like in the environment of Cournot competition, thelocal social planner introduces a MQS qsqm
such as qsqm >q ∗
l .W ea s s u m et h a tqsqm −q∗






This instrument increases the high quality level and decreases the diﬀerentiation degree.
Proposition 6 The introduction of a MQS, close to q∗
l , increases the competition. The demand
of both products increases and consumers which are no active decreases (see ﬁgure 5).
Whatever the quality produced by the local ﬁrm, the MQS increases its market shares and the









(4qh−ql)2 > 0 because r>q
0
















(4qh−ql)2 < 0 because r>q
0








(4qh−ql)2 < 0b e c a u s er>q
0
h




























Figure 5: SQM impacts on the market shares of ﬁrms
These results are similar with Ronnen results but not with the results of the last section. All
consumers, who are active in the market before the implementation of the MQS, purchase a product
of higher quality. And more consumers are active in the market.
The eﬀets of the implementation of the label are diﬀerent depending on the competition. The
decrease of diﬀerentiation degree r decreases the wilingness to pay for the high quality product (the
willingness of consumers to pay for the low quality product is the same) whatever the competition.
In a Bertrand competition, the ﬁrm h decreases its price, so the ﬁrm l reacts and decreases its
price. In a Cournot competition, the ﬁrm h decreases its supply, so the ﬁrm l reacts and increases
14its production. In Bertrand, all quality-adjusted prices d´ ecrease. In Cournot, only the quality-
adjusted price of the high quality product decreases.
















But only the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm h decreases:
dπh(qh,ql)
dql = ∂Rh






T h ei n c r e a s eo fql decreases the Rh,t h eﬁrm h increases its quality, but it is insuﬃcient for
prevent the decrease of its proﬁt. The ﬁrm h cannot improve its position because it cannot force
the ﬁrm l to play the initial quality, indeed the ﬁrm l cannot supply a quality inferior to the MQS.
Conversely to the case of Cournot competition, this situation beneﬁts to the ﬁrm l. Indeed, the
increase of qh increases Rl.
Now, we analyze the eﬀects of the MQS on the social welfare.
Proposition 7 The introduction of the MQS, close to q∗
l , increases the social welfare, whatever
the quality produced by the local ﬁrm.




θ0 (θql −pl)dθ. By fully diﬀerentiating
wh with respect to ql, substituting γhF0(qh)b yMRh and γhF00 by MRh












l) > 0 (Appendix 8)
wl = πl + scl + sch =
R θ1
θ0 (θql)dθ − γlF(ql)+
R 1
θ1(θqh − ph)dθ. By fully diﬀerentiating wl with















Like in the case of Cournot competition, the protectionist character of the SQM depends to
origins of the ﬁrms.
15Proposition 8 When the home ﬁrm produces the high-quality product, the introduction of the
MQS, close to q∗
l , may not be considered like a protectionist instrument, the quantity of the foreign
products does not decrease, and there is not monetary transfer of the foreign ﬁrm proﬁtt ot h eh o m e
ﬁrm proﬁt. Whereas when the home ﬁrm produces the low-quality product, the introduction of the
MQS, close to q∗
l , decreases the proﬁto ft h ef o r e i g nﬁrm and increases the proﬁt of the home ﬁrm,
the MQS is a protectionist instrument, the criterion on the proﬁt is broken.
We note that if the objective of the government is to improve the qualities and increase the
home social welfare, a MQS (equal to qb) is implement whatever the ﬁrm which supplies the lower
quality. When the home ﬁrm produces the low quality product, then the MQS may be consider
like protectionist because one of both critera is broken.
5 Conclusion and discussion
In this paper we demonstrate that, in a duopolistic model, the MQS is protectionist only if
the lower quality seller is local.
We note that the SQM beneﬁts to the low-quality sellers. This result contradicts the critics
of Southern countries which think that the MQS penalizes theirs exports (generally low-quality
products) to Northern countries. Indeed, if the Southern countries can supply a quality superior
to the Northern countries SQM (i.e. the SQM is not over restrictive), this instrument beneﬁts
them whatever the competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and the technology diﬀerential between the
southern industry and the northern industry.
In Cournot competition, when the home ﬁrm produces the high-quality product, the intro-
duction of a weakly restrictive MQS may not be considered like a protectionist instrument, the
quantity of the foreign products (x∗) does not decrease, and there is not monetary transfer of the
foreign ﬁrm proﬁt( π∗) to the home ﬁrm proﬁt( π). Whereas when the home ﬁrm produces the
low-quality product, the introduction of a weakly restrictive MQS decreases the quantity of the
16foreign products in favor of the home ﬁrm, the MQS is a protectionist instrument, the criterion on
the quantity is broken (see ﬁgure 6).
  COURNOT 
 
h the local firm 
BERTRAND 
 
h the local firm 
COURNOT 
 
l the local firm 
BERTRAND 
 
l the local firm 
x  - + +  + 
x*  + + - + 
π π π π  - - -  + 
π π π π*  - + - - 
sc  + + 
W  - + +  + 
 
Figure 6: MQS eﬀects on the payoﬀ of the players
In Bertrand competition, when the home ﬁrm produces the high-quality product, the intro-
duction of a weakly restrictive MQS may not be considered like a protectionist instrument, the
quantity of the foreign products does not decrease, and there is not monetary transfer of the for-
eign ﬁrm proﬁt to the home ﬁrm proﬁt. Whereas when the home ﬁrm produces the low-quality
product, the introduction of a weakly restrictive MQS decreases the proﬁto ft h ef o r e i g nﬁrm and
increases the proﬁto ft h eh o m eﬁrm, the MQS is a protectionist instrument, the criterion on the
proﬁti sb r o k e n( s e eﬁgure 6).
This paper has focused on the environment perfect information, so it is interesting to wonder




































































































< 0 because ∂MRh






























































< 0 indeed, ∂MRh





∂ql < 0a n dγlF00(ql) > 0.
Appendix 3
As in the Bertrand competition ∂MRh
∂ql
∂MRl














































































ql γhF00(qh)+γhF00(qh)γlF00(ql) > 0.
19Appendix 4
Cournot competition














Following the Euler’s theorem we obtain:
qh(∂MRh
∂qh )+ql(∂MRh




































with γlF00 − ∂MRl


























• πl > 0.
Proof. πl = Rl − γlF(ql)
MRl is continous and increasing in ql ( 1
16 for ql =0t o 5
27 for ql = qh). F0 is continous and
increasing in ql (0 for ql =0t o> 0f o rql = qh). The condition MRl(qh,q l)=γlF0(ql)h a sa
unique solution ql ∈ [0,q h].
We can deduce : MRl(qh,0) > γlF0(0) i.e lim
ql→0
∂πl
∂ql > 0s oi fqh > 0t h e nπl > 0f o rql low.
• πh > 0w i t hqh >q l.
Proof. As πl > 0, we show that πh − πl > 0.
Rh − Rl =
qh(qh−ql)
4qh−ql > 0.
As γF0(q)q>γF(q) we obtain:
F(qh) − F(ql) <F0(qh)(qh − ql).
As F0(qh)=MRh
γh et F0(ql)=MRl
γl , we obtain:
F(qh) − F(ql) < MRh
γh (qh − ql)i . e . :
γh (F(qh) − F(ql)) <MR h(qh − ql).
We deduce:
πh − πl = Rh − Rl − (γhF(qh) − γlF(ql)) >R h − Rl − (γhF(qh) − γhF(ql))
with γl > γh.
πh − πl >R h − Rl − (γhF(qh) − γhF(ql)) >R h − Rl − MRh(qh − ql)
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Bertrand competition
• πl > 0
Proof. πl = Rl − γlF(ql)
MRl is continous and decreasing in ql ( 1
16 for ql =0t o−1
9 for ql = qh). F0 is continous and
increasing in ql (0 for ql =0t o> 0f o rql = qh). The condition MRl(qh,q l)=γlF0(ql)h a sa
unique solution ql ∈ [0,q h].
We can deduce : MRl(qh,0) > γlF0(0) i.e lim
ql→0
∂πl
∂ql > 0s oi fqh > 0t h e nπl > 0f o rql low.
• πh > 0p o u rqh >q l
Proof. As πl > 0, we show that πh − πl > 0.
Rh − Rl =
qh(qh−ql)
4qh−ql > 0.
As γF0(q)q>γF(q) we obtain:
F(qh) − F(ql) <F0(qh)(qh − ql).
As F0(qh)=MRh
γh et F0(ql)=MRl
γl , we obtain:
F(qh) − F(ql) < MRh
γh (qh − ql)i . e . :
γh (F(qh) − F(ql)) <MR h(qh − ql).
We deduce:
πh − πl = Rh − Rl − (γhF(qh) − γlF(ql))
πh − πl = Rh − Rl − (γhF(qh) − γhF(ql)) + (γl − γh)F(ql)








(4qh−ql)3 (qh − ql)
´
+( γl − γh)F(ql)
22πh − πl >q h(qh − ql)ql
4qh−7ql
(4qh−ql)3 +( γl − γh)F(ql)w i t hγl > γh




Choi et Shin (1992) show that in a duopolistic model with products diﬀerantiated and
Bertrand competition, the diﬀerentiation degree is 7
4 when the cots are equal to zero. Motta




2 ). As, the more important the technology diﬀerential is, the more respected
the condition πh − πl > 0 is, we may assume that
qh
ql > 7
4 is weakly restrictive.
We obtain πh > πl > 0.
Appendix 6
Cournot competition






































∂qh − γhF00(qh) < 0a n d∂MRh
∂ql − γlF00(ql) < 0 (annexe 2).




































































































































































































l)(−4qh+ql)2 > 0w i t hσ =
ql
qh and σ ∈ ]0,1[
because σ4 +8 σ3 − 12σ2 +3 2 σ − 64 < 0w i t hσ ∈ ]0,1[.






















































































































































































































































































l) < 0w i t hσ =
ql
qh and σ ∈ ]0,1[.
Bertrand competition
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